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Introduction \ 
"If Ne begin Nith the proposition that ours is a 
system of laws, not of men, Ne immediately 
confront the reality that the system is only as 
good as the men and Nomen Nho administer it." 
(Escovitz 1) 
For most individuals, "justice" is defined by a ~ 
/ decision of a ~udge in a courtroom. Whether it is through 
a personal experience at their local county courthouse or 
through a decision of the United States Supreme Court, the 
actions of the judge invariably shape the public's view of 
our country's legal system. 
While the United States Constitution clearly outlines how 
federal judges are to be chosen in Article 2, Section 
Paragraph 2, no indication is made as to the process in 
which the lower courts were to follow in deciding how state 
judges were to be selected. And therein lies the dilemma. 
Presently, there are two methods for selecting judges: 
appointment and popular election. There are variations of 
both plans; and both plans have their supporters and their 
critics. While surveying the literature concerning 
judicial selection, however, it is disquieting to see how 
often the ultimate goals of both plans remain vague and 
elusive. Advocates of a particular position rarely attempt 
to track the implications and interrelations of various 
plans for selecting judges, filling interim vacanies, 
,
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retaining incumbents. length of terms. procedures for 
removal, or even the kind of job the public demands in the 
courtroom. Rather. a lot of theory and few facts usually 
characterize presentations abot the actual impact of 
alternative methods for filling judicial positions. 
The goal, therefore, of this paper was to e>:amine both 
methods and their variations; to look at the empirical and 
normative data which support and refute them; and to make a 
conclusion based thereupon. The facts, in my opinion, 
support the fol~owing conclusion: 
Judicial selection through the process of popular 
election, while not a perfect instrument, provides a higher 
degree ~f accountability and achieves the same level of 
"independence" from political forces as the merit plan. 
Moreover, the popular election process is more consistent 
with the overlying theme of a participatory democracy 
dictated by the founding fathers and implemented by 
following generations. 
Before we take a close look at the two systems, 
however, it is helpful to look at the previous history of 
how merit and elective methods of judicial selection were 
established in the United States. 
History 
Historically, there has been considerable controversy 
about how American judges should be chosen. Like most of 
our legal institutions, our methods for selecting judges 
have their roots in England. After the American 
Revolution, the original thirteen states reacted against 
the selection of judges by executive appointment and 
overwhelmingly chose methods of selection that did not 
reflect the English colonial practice (Ashman 8). 
In eight states the power of appointment was vested in 
one or both houses of the legislature. Two states allowed 
appointment by the governor and his council. In only three 
states was the power of appointment vested in the governor, 
and even then the power was checked by the legislature. 
The new states were suspicious of the executive influence 
on the judiciary. They did not consider the populace fit 
to select its judicial office~s. No state provided for a 
popularly elected judiciary (Berekson 3). 
Unlike the wide variation in state methods for 
selecting judges, the federal process has remained quite 
stable. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 
Alexander Hamilton, proposed a method in which the 
President was granted authority to nominate and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint justices of 
the supreme court (Ashman 10). 
Beginning in the mid-1800's the appointment of state 
3 
jUdges by the executive or legislaute was drastically 
curtailed. The concept of an elected jUdiciary emerged 
during the Jacksonian era as part of a larger movement 
aimed at democratizing the political process in America. 
It was spearheaded by reformers who contended that the 
concept of an elitist judiciary did not square with the 
ideology of a government under popular control (Escovitz 
13) • 
In 1832 Mississippi became the first state to elect 
all jUdges. By action of its constitutional convention in 
1846, New Yorl: led the change from gubernatorial and 
legislative appointment to direct popular election. For 
the next century the 19 new states entering the Union, 
provided for an elected judiciary (Ashman 10). 
Toward the end of the 19th century the results from 
popular election of the judiciary began to emerge. The 
Tammany Hall organization in New York epitomized the 
potential abuses of partisan judicial contests. Seizing 
control of the political processes that led to nomination, 
Tammany was able to run and elect its hand-picked and 
politically responsive slate of judicial candidates 
(Berkson 5). 
Dissatisfaction and resentment of political party 
control of judicial candidates led to a counter-reform 
movement. Bar leaders attempted to control the power of 
political party organizations through a variety of devices, 
such as nonpartisan ballots, separate judicial nominating 
conventions and elections, and direct primaries. They also 
attempted to increase the influence of the legal profession 
on judicial selection by conducting and publishing bar 
association referenda with respect to their recommendations 
on the fitness of candidates (Escovitz 13). 
In an address before the American Bar Association, 
Roscoe E. Pound, a young law professor, noted that popular 
judicial elections were a major cause of public 
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. In 
1913, before the ABA, William Howard Taft, ex President, 
declared that even the nonpartisan judicial ballot was a 
failure. He asserted tat such a system permitted 
unqualified persons who were incapable even of political 
support to become elected through a vigorous campaign. In 
that same year the American Judicature Society was founded. 
Dedicated to promoting the efficient administration of 
justice the organization was particularly concerned with 
methods of selection, tenure,and retirement of judges 
(Escov~tz 12). 
Albert M. Kales, a law professor at Northwestern, and 
director of research for the American Judicature Society, 
set out to devise a method of judicial selection that would 
maximize the benefits and minimize the weaknesses of both 
the appointment and election processes. In essence, Kales 
sought to preserve the informed and intelligent choice 
which is the strong point of the appointive system while 
retaining ultimate voter control (Ashman 9). 
/l;Jl. 
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The system devised by Kales and promoted by. the 
American Judicature Society did combine appointments with 
election. It also added a very important third element- a 
judicial nominating commission. Under the Kales Plan, an 
elected chief justice would fill judicial vacancie~ from a 
list submitted by the commission which was expected to seek 
out the best available judicial talent. Once on the bench, 
these judges would thereafter go before the voters on the 
sole question of their retention (Ashman 10). 
In 1926 Harold Laski, an English political scientist, 
proposed as a slight variation for the Kales Plan that the 
governor be substituted for the chief justice as the 
appointing agent. The Kales-Laski proposal contained the 
basic features upon which most subsequent plans for 
judicial reform have been based. The three part approach 
consisted of a) a judicial nominating commission to 
nominate candidates for the bench, b) an elected official, 
usually from the executive branch who would make his 
appointments from a list submitted by the commission, and 
c) subsequent nonpartisan and noncompetitive elections in 
which judges so chosen would run on their records (Ashman 
1ll. 
For nearly 25 years, the plan remained dormant and 
most states continued to elect their judges. In 1937, the 
American Bar Association endorsed the Kales-Laski proposal. 
Three years later it was voted into the constitution of 
Missouri and quickly became known as the "Missouri Plan" 
?v,z 
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The definition of "merit plan" that most scholars use 
when describing judicial selection is: 
H a permanent nonpartisan commission of lawyers 
and non-lawyers that initially and independently 
generates, screens, and submits a list OT 
judicial nominees to an official who is legally 
or voluntarily bound to make a decision from the 
fllist. (Ashman 12) 
One should be aware that there are other definitions 
of the "merit plan" when describing judicial selection. In 
fact, a large number of states and cities have adopted a 
variety of "merit plans", however for the sake of our 
discussion we will considered them to be true merit plans 
in that they meet part of the definition stated above. 
The Merit Plan 
In 1969, Watson and Downing of the University of 
Missouri undertook a comprehensive study of the origin, 
operation and consequences of the Missouri plan in that 
state, gathering data from the entire 25 years the plan had 
been in operation. Regarding the claim that the plan takes 
judicial selection out of politics they wrote. 
"It is naive to suggest that the plan takes the 
politics out of judicial selection. Instead the 
plan is designed to bring to bear on the process 
of selecting judges a variety of interests that 
are thought to have a legitimate concern in the 
matter and at the same time to discourage other 
intrests. It may be assumed that these interests 
will engage in the Hpolitics H of judicial
 
selection~ that is~ they will maneuver to
 
influence Nho ~il1 be chosen as judges."
 
Thus, far from taking judicial selection out of 
politics, the Missouri Plan actually tended to replace 
politics, wherein the judge faces popular election or 
selection by a popularly elected official, with a somewhat 
indirect process of state bar and bench politics 
masquerading as professionalism. The conclusion is 
inescapable: merit selection has little or no merit if by 
merit we mean that nonpolitical considerations dominate the 
slection process. Professional considerations turn out to 
be next to meaningless when applied in the real world. 
They are ideals that no one has succeeded in translating 
into tangible workable guidelines. (Ashman and Alfini, 67) 
Moreover, it is contradictory to attempt to remove 
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Supreme Court, Court ofAppeals, and those Circuit Courts which have 
adopted the Commission plan. (To date commission plans exist for the 
-circuit courts ofJackson, Clay, Platte and S1. Louis Counties and the City 
ofSt Louis).': ' -,' __ . . .'- -- .. -" !.. ,": :;-:-);.; ?:,-,,- -.,', .-,::' .'"c.: '''-
A InitialSeteetion:' -•.•. ,.. _ :":';:' ''''';'-'-- ".. .'" 
Judges are appointed by the governor from a list ofnominees submit­
ted by a nonpanisan judicial selection commission, If the governor 
fails to appoint a candidate within 60 days of receipt of the list the 
commission appoints one of the nominees to fill the vacancy. 
Mo, Canst. an. V, sec. 25(a) 
B,	 Vacancies: 
\acancies are filled as in initial selection. 
C.	 Retention: 
The appointee serves an initial term ending on December 31 following 
the next general election after the expiration of twelve months in 
office. At the general election held prior to the expiration ofhis tenn an 
appointed judge may run for retention, Failure to file a declaration of 
candidacy for retention creates a vacancy, The question of retention is 
placed on a separate nonpartisan judicial ballot. A judge must win a 
majority of votes in favor or retention in order to serve a full tenn, 
Otherwise, a vacancy exists. 
Mo. Canst. an. V, sec 25 (c) (1) 
D.	 Terms: 
The initial appointive term is for one year after appointment and until a
 
successor has been elected and qualified.
 
The full terms are:
 
Supreme Caurt: 12 years
 
Court ofAppeals: 12 years
 
Circuit Coun:
 
Circuit CounJudge: 6 years
 
Associate Circu,it]udge: 4 years
 
Mo. Canst. an. V, sec. 19
 
Circuit Courts (in those counties which have not adopted the commis­
sion plan) and Municipal Courts 
A	 Initial Selection: 
1.	 Circuit court judges and associate circuit judges are selected in 
panisan elections. 
Mo. Canst. an. V, sec. 16 
111 
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Circuit Court (Associate Judges ) 
A Initial Selection: 
J~;:;;:Z~·
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Associate judges are appointed by the circuit judges in each circuit as 
the supreme court provides by rule. The chief judge ofthe circuit gives 
notice of a vacancy and attorneys may apply to fill the vacancy. Each 
circuit judge is presented with a ballot and mayvote for one candidate 
for each vacancy. 
III. Const. art. 6, sec. 8 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 11OA, sec. 39 
B.	 Vacancies: 
See initial seleaion. 
C.	 Retention: 
An associate judge may file a request for reappointment with the chief 
judge of the circuit. Each circuit judge votes on the question of 
reappointment. 
III.	 Rev. Sta~h. 11OA, sec. 39 
D.	 Terms: 
Four years.
 
Ill. Const. art. 6, sec. 10.
 
Circuit Court (Resident Circuit Judge or Resident Judge) 
Ed. note:The term "resident circuit judge" or "resident judge" refers to 
a circuit judge who was appointed afterJune 30, 1971 by the supreme 
court to fill a vacancy existing prior to July 1, 1971 in the office of a 
former associate judge and whose office was, priortoJuly 1, 1971, filled 
by eleaion from a single county or, in the case ofCook County, from 
one of the 2 units of the county. 
Ill. Rev. Stat."ch. 37, sec. 72.41-1 
A	 Initial Selection: 
Initial Selection is by partisan general or judicial eleaion. 
III. Const. art. 6 .
 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, sec. 72.42
 
Relevant election law
 
See Pan I A, relevant election law.
 
B.	 Vacancies: .': ".. :::: ., 
See initial selection.:'·" 
C. Retention: ;:' :. '., .:~. ::::'~:'1:":I;'):: 
See initial selection. ;,~E:.:'! ;:'1 :,::.:.~;' ·c'!::i:;':;"i,"· 
D. Terms: ":::.:" " :!.!:~,.<) 
Four years . ::: :,' ,:' . ,. ::-:':-: ;'! 
III. Const. art. 6, sec. 10 
III. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, sec. 160.2 
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Court of Claims 
A.	 Initial Selection: 
Initial Selection is by gubernatorial appointment with the advice and 
consent of the senate. , 
Ill. Rev. Stat ch. 37, sec. 439.1 ,,',,':-"',',.:,' > ,,:', >:::',J' .. ,
. ' . . .- ., '. ..,' .	 ", . ~ 
B., Vacat!cies: i, , ":" ':" "!",~"':',r " .. '.. ",' : :";,,:', ::i;' , >:' 
, ""', See initial selection: In case of a vacancy during the recess of the ,
 
,,': 'senate, the governor makes a temporary appointment until the next
 
," meeting of the senate, when the governor nominates a person to fill
 
the office. : ;' ::: ,::. ,," 
, III. Rev. Stat ch. 37, sec. 439.1 ' 
C.	 Retention: 
At the end ofa term a judge ofthe court ofclaims must be reappointed 
by the governor; with the senate's approval, in order to retain office. 
III.	 Rev. Stat. ch. 37, sec. 439.2 
D.	 Tenns:
 
Six years
 
III. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, sec. 439.2 
" 
1.;"",',:,'" ~, ,\, i' ,'" ·'i. , 
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politics from the process of selecting political decision 
makers. As long as judges decide cases on the basis of 
socioeconomic and political values, those who choose judges 
will undestandably insist that these same value 
considerations weigh heavily in the seletion process. It 
can be no other way, although reformers will continue in 
their attempt to lead using the search for the 
philosopher's stone by perpetuating the myth, that internal 
contradiction, of nonpolitical selection. (Glick 55) 
A second argument fre,!",,-,tl y made by proponents of 
merit selection is that in replacing partisan political 
considerations with professional criteria, the merit plan 
invevitably produces better judges- that is judges with 
superior professional and personal qualifications. Beyond 
a consenus that judges ought to be judicious, have proper 
judicial temperament, be objective, and perhaps have prior 
judicial experience, therr remains no direct measure of 
what a good judge is. Not only is there little evidence 
of the superiority of judges selected by the merit system 
(although there is some evidence to the contrary), there is 
in fact little to show that judicial selection mechanisms, 
make any difference at all. 
In an early study in 1964 examining trial judges in 
twelve states with different types of selection systems, 
Herbert Jacob found that "if judicial quality can be 
measured by the e>:tent of prelaw college education, or 
attendance at a prestigious law school, the Missouri plan 
Missouri found that in 179 separate judicial ballots over a 
twenty five year period, only one judge was ever turned out 
of office, and this under highly unusual 
circumstances. (Watson and Downing, 345). In a more recent 
study of 353 judges, who stood for retention elections, 
only three trial judges were rejected. (Jenkins, 80) This 
indicates a rejection rate so low (an average of about 
seven tenths of one percent based on the above data) as to 
be inconsequential. 
It is not difficult to understand why retention 
elections do not work. The old political saw "you can beat 
somebody wth nobody" clearly applies. Overall, merit plan 
judges are retained by seventy five to eighty percent of 
the vote. Although turnout is usually quite low, and this 
obtains almost without regard to the judges party, age, 
ability, or any other known vairable. Between 1970 and 1978 
the Illinois State Bar Association recommended against the 
retention of thirty three sitting judges. Thirty one of 
these were retained. In 1972, they recommeded against ten, 
all of whom were retained. In 1978, the Chicago Council of 
Lawyers, one of two Chicago area bar associations which 
rate incumbent judges, recommended against retaining 
thirteen judges, twelve were retained. (Jenkins 84) 
If the lay, the professional, and even the political 
inputs built into the Missouri plan do not work as 
advertised, and if the plan in general cannot be shown to 
produce superior judges, what is left of the argument? The 
AppendixB
 
Number of]udges Not Retained: 1972-1978*
 
Nurnberof . 
'.' States Holding Judges on ' '-' :'.' Number of 
. Retention . Retention .. ;,:,>~ 'judges Not 
.' . Ball --' .:' "~,;.:, . ed . :;'.' year '. :' . :':':: .Elections ots " "."' .:" .:' Retain :.:.... 
1972"" Alaska 
. Colo13do 
Florida 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
Oklahoma 
Utah 
7. 
98 
4 
109 
8 
30 
3 
26 
8 
2 
11 
1 
""'.' 3 
,'.._' ._ ;". ~_ i, . 
. 
Total 11 306 4 
1974 Alaska 
California 
Colo13do 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
Oklahoma 
Tennessee 
Utah 
\'{yorning 
18 
28 
41 
60 
40 
7 
51 
3 
35 
23 
7 
16 
6 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Total 14 341 4 
1976 Alaska 
Arizona 
Colo13do 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
. Kansas 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Oklahana 
10 
18 
95 
7 
41 
2 
30 
26 
24 
21 
S5 
4 
1 
1 
1 
79
 
Appendix B (cont'd.) 
fulZ 
f /6 
Year 
States Holding 
Retention 
Elections 
Nurnberof 
Judges on 
Retention 
Ballots 
Number of 
Judges Not 
. Retained 
Tennessee 
Utah 
~orning 
Total 15 
1978	 Alaska 
Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Florida 
Idaho 
Il1inois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Maryland 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
Oklahoma 
Tennessee 
Utah 
~orning 
Total 17 
4 
5 
11 
353 
18 
24 
29 
84 
9 
54 
93 
10 
61 
29 
5 
34 
14 
6 
4 
20 
5 
499 
3 
2 
4 
4 
1 
2 
13 
Grand Total	 1499 24 
• Georgia and Pennsylvania hold retention elections in odd-nwnbered years. 
1973 1975 1977 1979 
Georgia B/O B/O 
PennS)1vania 19/1 3910 19/0 35/2 
The first figure indicates the nwnber of jwges running on the retention ballot; the second 
indicates the nwnber not retlined. 
•• Dati for 1972 were tlken from "Merit Retention Elections in 1972," ]udicaturf!, 56 
(January, 1973), 254-56. Data for 1973-1979 were obtlined directly from stlte gO\emment 
offices. 
80
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answer is, not much. However, despite the lack of emprical 
evidence supporting the superiority of merit selection, the 
idea of professional neutrality in judicial recruitment is 
both appealing and consistent with general professional 
ideology. Futhermore, advocates of the merit plan make 
strong arguments, which we will examine, against the 
alternative method. (Glick 34) 
Judicial Election 
If merit selection, among these dimensions examined, 
has so little merit, what are the alternatives? All this 
considered is it preferrable to elect judges? Or is 
legislative or perhaps executive selection the best system. 
Our answer must depend on the perceived consequences of 
these altenative plans and upon how we would weigh such 
consequences. The familar argument usually set in favor of 
electing judges is that: 
HUhereas America purports to be a democracy;
 
whereas democracy is usually defined as a
 
governmental arrangement ~herein policy makers 
are held accountable to policy recipients;, 
~hereas Judges are policy making officials~ and 
~hereas elections are the usual method for 
ensuring or at least promoting political 
accountablity; election is the preferred method 
of judicial selection~ because such a system best 
assures accountability and hence is the most 
consistent with prnciples of democratic 
government. H 
The central point to be made about judicial elections 
1S that they are not elections, at least as that term is 
generally understood. This is true on several counts. 
First, in states providing for the election of at least 
some judges, whether on a partisan or nonpartisan ballot, 
and that includes some thirty states by 1986, a large 
proporti~n of judges initially obtain their seats by 
executive appointment. Herndon found that fifty six percent 
of those who became judges during the period from 1948 to 
1957 were appointed by state governors to replace judges 
174 I CMpter 5 The Politics of Judicial Selection 
TABLE 5-3 
"Elected" Trial JUdges Initially Gaining Office by Appointment 
Partisan Election States	 Nonpartisan Election Slates 
Arkansas 5.9% Michigan 34.3% 
West Vuginia 10.3% Ohio 40.5%' 
New York 23.2% Kentucky 44.8% 
lllinois 26.8% Wisconsin 49.0% 
Louisiana 29.2% North Dakota 50.0% 
Mississippi 33.4% South Dakota 52.2% 
Alabama 42.4% Montana 61.1% 
Pennsylvania 51.5% Oregon 66.7% 
Georgia 57.8% Washington 67.6% 
Tennessee 57.8% Nevada 73.3% 
New Mexico 73.0% 1daho 83.3% 
North Carolina / 68.2% Maryland California 84.5% 88.3% 
Minnesota 93.0% 
Floridab 
, 
Oklahomab 
" . 
, 
SOURCE: John Plul Ryan. Allan Ashman. Ind Bruce D. Sal... "JudJcial S.lection and its Impact aD ni.1 Judge,' a.d· 
around. PttrcllpUoa. and Pt:rform.nc.... Piper pre••nted It Lb. We.tern Political Selenci AJlociaUOD Me.ting. Lo, ADSI­
I... March 18_18, 1978, Tabl. 10. p. 211 (original dati rubed for lDcJualoD baNjo). 
" , 
• Ohio is not entirely I nonpartisan system for selecting judges. Judges of general jurisdiction are Dom·
 
inated by partisan primary. then elected on a nonpartisan ballot.
 
b Florida. in 1971. and Oklahoma. in 1967, changed from partisan election 10 Donpartinn election. It is
 
dilficult from our data to provide reliable estimates of the percentage of judges initially elected under
 
either system.
 
•t· 
t 
there is a contest, the challenger is usually unsuccessful. TypiCally, if com­
petition emerges, it is more likely to occur against judges who were originally 
elected than those who received their seats through appointment. Further­
more, competition is more likely in the first election than in subsequent
races.'· 
,• 
.. In North Dakota between 1950 and 1970. district judges' races went uncontested .bout 80 
percent of the time. See note, "judicial Selection in North Dakota: Is Constitutional Revision 
Necessary?" North Dokota !.<Jw Review 48. NO.2 (Winter 1972): 333. And Glicl: argues that: 
.. ' ~1DtaI numJier-of JudJcial elections held. in the lifty·statea;c1osely conteste9. 
WI;r.	 -unJulhcial. jUlfiC181 eliidlOIlSifiODaDl~~~1p 
~en percent 01 the Iota!: Figure" froin Oiliiii ~-sho\Vll:iiit f~ judg"! "" qUI in,,ever. challenged; and almost never face • c1os.~'t c8 !!'p'!!!!?£ven!lfuli 
ve:l
'tbnlect1all1SbVer, no iii8lill how IE was touii1lC'l!i8Ul~fiisU8l1y comeso'NI 
li'8~ei·· .. -.. .. _	 191 
sol!!.eeGUek.~iiilae and the p,;ifOnn~nC1l" ·p:S19) I 
_I 
Ru:z 
riD 
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. ' . . " ILLINOIS	 , .. 
• '	 ...., ",': : . • .., : l' • . '. ! ~. ,_ ::: ;:. '., . 
Supreme Court, Appellate Court and ~Circuit Court .. , '.. ;, ," 
, ,,,_1 'le' "'..' ... ' , , ' .. " ,-' ",." ,A	 In/llUl Se etzon: ,» ........ " .. ,: ."..... ,. '.», .. ' .. '--.' I''''':'''' ',:

.•~.~:_'.,.' .. - ..•.. , I:' r ."., "'i.:-, ;~'...~; i .• _•.·.~_:·· ~;" •. ;:.•• , •.. : ::': .•t_: ' . 
.... 
,Supreme, appellate and circuit judges are nominated at primary elec-: , 
'. _.	 - . . ..'" ',.J ~ 
tions or by petition and elected at general or judicial elections on a 
partisan ballot. ,',.:_ .. , .,,',';, .. :"',:.::':~;:'::-:::;;:; 
Ill. Const art. 6, sec. 12 
Relevant election law	 
: '" 
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 46, sees. 2A-1.l, 2A·9, 7-1, 7·5, 7-10, 7-12, 7-19, 7-61, 
7-63, 7A-1, 16·16-.1, 17-18.1,24-11 
B.	 Vacancies: 
Y.icancies are filled by appointment of the supreme court A person 
appointed to fill a vacancy 60 or more days prior to ~ next primary 
election to nominate judges serves until the vacancy is filled at the next 
general or judicial election. A person appOinted to fill a vacancy less 
than 60 days prior to the next primary election serves until the vacancy 
is filled at the second election following such appoinunent. 
Ill. Canst art. 6, sec. 12(c) 
Relevant election law 
See initial selection. 
C.	 Retention: 
NOt less than six months before the general election preceding the 
expiration of his term of office, a supreme, appell:ue or circuit judge 
who has been elected to that office may file a declaration ofcandidacy 
to succeed himself. The names of judges seeking retention are submit­
ted to voters, separatelyand without parrydesignation, on the question 
of whether the judge shall be retained in office for another term. An 
affirmative vote of three-fifths ofthe electors voting on the question is 
';	 required for retention. 
Ill. Canst art. 6, sec. 12(d) 
Relevant election law 
.":	 See initial selection. &. 
", D. Terms: 
>. Supreme Court: 10 years 
Appellate Court: 10 years 
Circuit: 6 years 
Ill. Canst art 6, sec. 10 
HI 
Mo. Ann. Stat sec. 478.010 (Vernon)
 
Mo. Ann. Stat sec. 478.320 (Vernon)
 
2.	 Any ciry; town or village may, and cities with a population of four
 
hundred thousand or more must, provide for a municipal judge or
 
judges. Associate circuit judges aa as municipal judges in any
 
municipality with a population of under four hundred thousand
 
which has requested associate judges to aa as municipal judges and
 
which has not provided for a municipal judge. In those municipali­

ties that have provided for municipal judges the method ofselec­

tion is detennined by charter or ordinance.
 
Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 23
 
Mo. Ann. Stat. sec. 479.020 (Vernon)
 
B.	 Vacancies: 
'l.!cancies in the office of circuit judge or associate circuit judge are
 
filled by special eleaion.
 
Temporary vacancies and vacancies which arise less than six months
 
prior to a general municipal eleaion are filled by appointment of the
 
mayor or chainnan of the board of trustees. Y.1cancies which occur
 
more than six months priorto the general municipal eleaion are filled
 
by special eleaion.
 
Mo. Ann. Stat. sec. 479.230 (Vernon)
 
Relevant eleaion law
 
Mo. Ann. Stat. sec. 115.123 (Vernon)
 
Mo. Ann. Stat. sec. 115.125 (Vernon)
 
Mo. Ann. Stat. sec. 115.127 (Vernon)
 
C.	 Retention: . 
. ..
,See initial seleaion.	 
~ 
D.	 Terms: 
1.	 Circuit Court: ,• 
Circuit]udges: 6 years 
Associate Circuit]udges: 4 years 
Mo.	 Canst. art V, sec. 19 
2.	 Municipal judges' terms are provided for by local chaner or ordi­

nance but in no case can they be less than two years.
 
Mo. Ann. Stat sec. 479.020 (Vernon)
 
l7<>b.ate.<::0urt Cornmissio~ers . _;. . ... . " . . _. '. .; 
.... Ed. note: There are three types 'ofprobate court commissioners: those 
in counties having a population greater than 400,000, thUcie in]ackson 
County and those in St. louis County. Probate court is a division ofthe 
circuit court. 
112 
' . 
, 
; 
A	 Initial Selection: 
Commissioners in counties haVing a population of greater than 
400,000 and commissioners in St. Louis County are appointed by the 
judge of the probate division of the circuit court. 
Commissioners inJackson Countyare appointed bya majorityofthe 
circuit court judges meeting en bane. '.' ,'. ',:.:L· ...\. 
Mo. Ann. Stat sec. 478.265 (\ernon);" .. ,. ,. '::....::c,'·,'· ',"" ~<;)Ii:. 
Mo. Ann Stat sec. 478.267 (Vernon):'; :: ::; .'r~·. :':;:.~,. :;.;;;;;:,:).~ 
Mo. Ann. Stat. sec. 478.266 (Vernon) ',,~,' ,.' it,. . ... " ," // 
B.	 Vacancies: :.' ... '........, ;', " 
See initial selection. • \'\. 'c' •.. 
C.	 Retention: ' . .. 
See initial selection. 
, 
.' D. Terms: 
Commissioners in counties having a population greater than 400,000 
serve at the pleasure ofthe judge who appointed them but in no case 
do they serve beyond the tenn of the appointing judge. 
Commissioners in St. Louis and Jackson counties serve four year 
terms. 
Mo. Ann, Stat. sec. 478.265 (\ernon) 
Mo. Ann. Stat. sec. 478.267 (Vernon) 
Mo. Ann. Stat. sec. 478.266 (\ernon) 
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.! 
who had retired, resigned, or died while in office. Another 
study confirmed this finding and gave support to Herndon's 
chief conclusion. In all state supreme courts in 
non-Southern states from 1948 to 1974, fifty three percent 
of the 436 jUdges studied were initially appointed, Sixty 
seven percent of "elective" judges were appointed in 
nonpartisan election states, whereas forty two percent were 
so selected in partisan states. (Dubois, 106) The American 
JUdicature Society undertook a nation wide study of the 
same phenomenon regarding trial judges. Their 1977 survey 
found that thirty percent of sitting trial judges in 
partisan states were initially appointed. Whereas some 
fifty seven percent were appointed in nonpartisan states. 
(Ryan, Ashman, and Sales, 26) 
This brings us to a second general reason judicial 
elections are often criticized as someting less than 
meaningful: the very low incidence of electoral turnover of 
judicial seats. A host of factors relating to the rules of 
the game of judicial election and voter behavior help to 
explain why this is so. In the first place, the level of 
competiton is typically very low. Furthermore, competition 
is more likely in the first election than in subsequent 
races. Glick argues that 
Hof the total number of judicial elections held 
in the fifty states, closely contested, partisan 
Hunjudical H judicial elections contstituted no 
more than five to seven percent of the total. 
Figures from other research show that few judges 
are ever challenged, and almost never face a 
close, hard fought campaign. Even after the 
f 2'{
 
election is over no matter hON it Nas fought the 
incumbent usually comes out the Ninner." (Glick 
519J 
Judicial elections, therefore, though we have hardly
 
covered all facets of the process, seem to fall short of
 
their ideal function which is to ensure accounta~lity of
 
judicial behavior. Or at least this is so as they are
 
presently being conducted.
 
The second major part of the attack on popular 
elections is based upon a philosophic and normative 
argument not likely to be solved by empirical research. 
Critics assert that elections are inherently inconsistent 
with the principle of "judicial independence", a value 
which critics insist is fundamental to the sucessful 
operation of the judicial process. 
Elections interfere with the role of judge as the 
unbiased and objective decision maker. Second, critics 
assert that judges need not be held accountable by 
elections because they are not engaged in the formulation 
or implementation of public policy. Finally, it is argued 
that even if it is admitted that judges make political 
decisions and engage in the making of public policy, the 
special place of the judiciary in the political system 
. demands that judges not be held accountable for their 
actions (Daly 1). 
The advocates of judicial accountability deny that 
courts require independence in order to give proper 
interpretation to constitutional and statuatory provisions. 
!CUll; 
f-2S 
Judicial revieN is not the product primarily OT 
special legal erudtion or the objective vieNs oT 
constitutional and legal oracles, iT it Nere, 
lldivine appointment ll Nould then be the proper 
method oT recruitment (Dubois 27), 
The independent exercise of power of judicial review 
is undemocratic because it allows judges to make public 
policy without being responsive to, or held accountable by, 
the people or their representatives. In a democracy, the 
people, through the principle of majority rules, should be 
able to decide all questions of public policy, including 
those which bear upon the unflolding meaning of their 
constitution (Daly 5). 
The critics of judicial elections do not rest their 
case solely on the requirement of judicial independence. 
Additionally, they argue that even if the need for judicial 
accountability is recognized, judicial elections are 
nevertheless ineffective mechanisms for securing popular 
control over the courts (Volcansek 18). 
This is the most fundamental and damning of the 
criticisms leveled against popular elections. If elections 
do not hold judges accountable, as they are intended to do, 
then little else may commend them over other methods of 
selection. According to the critics, a nominating 
commission and a governor can, by virtue of the 
informational resources at their disposal, do a better job 
than the voters in successfully eliminating individuals who 
are ill-suited to hold a judicial office (Dubois 40). 
First, popular control aver the judiciary is inhibited 
by the fact that judicial election campaigns do nat involve 
a discussion by opposing candidates of substantive issues 
of judicial policy. Second, due to the issueless and 
lackluster campaigns, critics urge that public attention to 
judicial contests is low, due to lack of interest. Third, 
it is argued that popular control over the judiciary 
through judicial election is threated by the fact that 
judicial elections are rarely seriously contested 
(Vol cansek 49). 
Admittedly, voters do not and probably cannot inform 
themselves on the details of the wide range of problems 
facing governmentand the merits of the variety of proposed 
solutions which government officials might adopt. But the 
important point is that voters need not be interested 
enough and informed enough to choose their leaders on the 
basis of specific policy issues. Though they cannot 
control the details of policy, voters can control the 
direction of policy formation. "The voters pI ay an· 
indirect role in the determination of public policy" 
<Dubois 22) 
Voters are not the philosophical citizens demanded by 
a classical democratic theory, but neither are they 
manipulated subjects, driven in their voting behavior by 
irrational considerations unrelated to policy. The voters 
can affect and' keep judges accountable for their actions if 
they are informed enough to make these general policy 
decisions. 
Conclusion 
While the debate rages as to form, the underlying 
reality remains the same: neither those who influence the 
judicial selection process nor the substantive outcomes are 
much affected gy a change in the method of judicial 
section. Glick makes the point: 
HIt is probably impossible to alter the dominant 
features of a state political system by creting a 
new method of judicial selction. Instead, well 
established patterns of party politics and the 
action of political officials will adapt to the 
new method of selection and in turn, find ways of 
making the new method operate within the context 
of existing political conditions." 
The conclusions we have drawn concerning the 
influences at work in judicial selection also help us to 
understand why researchers are able to find so little 
difference in judicial recruitment outcomes, irrespective 
of the mechanism selected. The answer to the riddle, 
therefore, is that the mechanisms of each selection method 
are not that different; in fact, the end results dictate 
that they are about the same. Hence the exaggerated claims 
for one method, as well as criticism, by advocates of the 
other, are equally without foundation. If one method fails 
to produce distinctively better judges than the other, it 
is also true that competing selection methods also fail to 
produce the disastrous results often predicted by its 
critics. Neither the professional politician nor the 
professional legal practiioner has anything to gain through 
,t(;il. 
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the appointment of incompetent persons to the bench. As 
already explained, political parties have a good deal 
riding on judicial performance, not only in terms of 
substantive policy outcomes but also in the favorable 
reflection on the party. Even more, legal professionals 
are concerned with selecting candidates with reputations of 
intelligence and skill, both political and legal. Both 
sides therefore, usually select well-qualified people who 
in turn perform in an acceptable manner. Mistakes occur, to 
be sure, but they are not due to the method of judicial 
selection. 
Having said this, however, it is still neccesary to 
choose some method of judicial selection. As noted 
ea~lie~, the final decision of which judicial ~elEction 
method to choose depends primarily on the individual view 
of how the judiciary should function as well as the 
collective view of how the politics of the other systems of 
government should interact with the judicial system. At 
first look, selection by popular elections, or 
alternatively, selection by popularly elected officials, 
is most consistent both with a political conceptualization 
of the judiciary and the requirements of democarcy. Simply 
put, if judges make policy, democratic governmental 
arrangements require that they be held accountable to the 
people, and elections are the best, though by no means a 
perfect, means of ensuring this accountability. (Dubois, 
768) 
The principles of merit selection, on.the other hand, 
seem more in keeping with a mechanical or Blackstonian veiw 
of the judicial function, and it could be argued, more 
consistent with a parentalistic view of society by the 
legal profession; (we the professionals know best who would 
make good judges). But if we can accept the logic of the 
argument that the popular election of judges is the 
preferred method; what of the accountability problem 
mentioned previously? Such accountablity is ill served by 
an electoral system that is to a large extent appointive 
and that in addition, lacks competitiveness and voter 
participation. 
The answer, I offer, is that the trouble with 
elections is not with the elections themselves but with 
their underlying logic. It is the myth that a nonpolitical 
judiciary, fostered by bench and bar through 
quasi-professional rules such as the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, and impossible expectations, that turns otherwise 
spirited campaigns for judicial offices into 
non-interesting ones. The belief that a frank discussion of 
issues compromises judicial independence or the view that 
their really are no issues to discuss, that judcial matters 
must be handled in a neutral manner, are the reasons why 
judicial elections are noncompetitive and judges do not 
campaign. Unfortunately, this runs contrary to the premise 
behind the ballot box and results in reducing the 
effectiveness of judicial elections in either bringing the 
judiciary to account, promoting competition, and sparking 
voter interest and knowledge. (Berg and Flynn, 45) As noted 
by Atki ns: 
"the process of conducting present judicial 
elections produces and perpetuates ignorance 
among the electorate. Jurisprudence assumes tQat 
judicial decisionmaking is qualitatively 
different from decisionmaking processes Nithin 
other governmental institutions. Horeover, th 
hallmark of the judicial robe is that of the 
neutral judge adjudicating disputes unencumbered 
by political liabilties. This drive tONard 
defending the integrity of the judicial 
profession, hONever, has meant in reality, that 
the kinds of information needed to evaluate 
judges performances are not made available to the 
electorate, particularly the judges vieN of 
issues Nhich might be relevant to pending or 
future litigation. The manner in Nhich relevant 
information concerning issues and candidates is 
made virtually inaccessible to the electorate 
establishes tremendous hurdles which supporters 
of Judicial elections must overcome. Naturally 
such a system Nould tend to produce poor results, 
at least from the perspective of knoweldgable 
voter participation." 
But even taking judicial elections as they are, they 
rather than as they could be, we might conclude that as 
instruments of accountabilty they have not totally failed. 
When compared with elections for the eMecutive and the 
legislature, rather than with a democratic ideal that has 
never been achieved in any election, they do not come off 
so badly. On this crucial point of effectiveness of 
partisan elections, since there really are no other kind, 
as instruments of accountabilty in the judiciary, the most 
thorough study to date of the process, again by Atkins, 
concludes as follows; 
"Though elections are blunt instruments of 
accountabilty, they are effective in maintaining 
popular control of the outer limits of " 
governmental decision making. As long as voters 
can kno~ ~ithin such ~ide limits the general 
ideological and political orientations of these 
individuals they put in policy making positions, 
they ~ill be able to exercise effective indirect 
control over their own affairs. In the conte~t 
of judicial elections, therefore, since it 
appears that a certain amount of judicial 
decision making will necessarily have a partisan 
base, regardless of the formal method of 
selection, voters can acheive maximum control 
over the broad outlines of judicial"policy 
through partisan elections, at least as much as 
they currently seem to have ~ith respect to 
controlling policymaking in the other t~o brances 
of government." (Atkins~ 155) 
The founding fathers gave us a republic with the catch 
that it is ours only if we can keep it. In harsh, 
idealistic terms, an irresponsible electorate gets what it 
deserves, sooner or later. To merely push decisions onto 
others in order to avoid or circumvent an ignorant 
electorate is not only dangerous but irresponsible. I am 
not against the merit plan because of what the merit plan 
encompasses, but because of the policy that it replaces and 
the precedent in which it is sets regarding the capability 
of the average citizen. 
If this nation is a true procedural democracy, then we 
should abandon the excuses whether or not they are 
justified that the public is, as a whole. too ignorant, 
uninterested, influenceable, indifferent, and apathetic to 
make the choices necessary to produce a judicial branch 
capabale of ensuring justice; and instead educate the 
public so that they can make a rational choice. I feel 
that it is contradicting to say that the same public who is 
supposedly responsible enough to decide on the most 
important elected position in the world, the President of 
the United States, and 535 senators and representatives is 
not responsible enough to vote for judges in their own 
state. 
I am skeptical that select commissions made up of the 
"more educated among us" are really more qualified to 
choose the better jUdge. People who favor merit plans over 
elections are showing a "transparent distrust of the 
electorate", a truly undemocratic ideal. They are showing 
an unyielding lack of faith in the ability of the 
electorate to size up the issues at hand and make a 
rational decision. They unrealistically and 
pessimistically refuse to believe that the public can be 
educated, and that they are not indifferent and 
disinterested. In closing, if the "merit plan" advocates 
are really trying to produce a higher quality. and effective 
judiciary, then thev should start by using the democratic 
process which the judiciary is swor.n to protect-- not 
circumventing it. 
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